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Uncertainty and the Double Dividend Hypothesis
Summary
This paper examines the double dividend hypothesis in the presence of labour income
uncertainty. Empirical evidence shows that uncertainty over labour income is
particularly significant in developing, while not negligible in developed countries.
Under uncertainty, and assuming incomplete capital markets, the tax system plays a role
in providing social insurance and a green tax reform influences its effectiveness. We
show that the increase in environmental tax reduces consumption risk while the
balanced budget decrease in labour income tax increases income risk. We find that the
total welfare effect of a green tax reform differs substantially from the case of certainty.
The critical parameters determining the existence of a second dividend are the lump
sum transfers, the relative substitutability of the two goods for leisure and the initial tax
rates relative to their optimal that determine also the response of labour supply to a
change in the tax mix.
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1

Introduction

Economists have long been advocating the use of environmental policies that
provide economic incentives, on the basis of eﬃciency. More recently, it
has been argued that the eﬃciency benefits of market based policies that
generate revenue, such as environmental taxation, may extend beyond the
environmental area if revenues are used to decrease existing distortionary
taxes, such as labour income taxes.
In this paper we extent the literature on revenue neutral environmental
tax shifts by introducing idiosyncratic uncertainty over income. Our analysis
is founded on the results of both theoretical and empirical literature showing
that labour supply decisions are aﬀected quite strongly by the presence of
uncertainty.1 Based on this evidence, it has been argued that some positive level of labor income taxation is optimal since it reduces uncertainty.
Uncertainty about labor income is likely to be particularly significant in developing countries, especially where private insurance is unavailable, but it
is not unimportant in developed ones.
Income fluctuations are more common and larger in developing relative to
developed countries. Townsend (1995) provides evidence from three developing economies indicating that risks are mostly of the idiosyncratic nature and
that only few individuals are able to diversify this risk. Developing and low
income nations cope with hardship mainly through the use of informal insurance systems (for example, household might take children out of school during
bad economic times or depend on reciprocal gift giving arrangements). Recent evidence indicate that these informal insurance arrangements, although
they provide some assistance, they are in general weak and more formal insurance systems through either publicly managed programs or private markets
can improve the social safety net of the economy (Townsend (1994), Morduch
(1999a)). Furthermore, financial markets are not well developed to allow individuals to access capital during bad economic times. Microfinance is a
promising new institution that oﬀers funding to low income people to under1

At the theoretical level, Eaton and Rosen (1980a) and more recently Menezes and
Wang (2005), have shown that labor supply can decrease in response to an increase in
wage rate uncertainty if risk aversion is significant. Ormiston and Schlee (1994) show
that an increase in wage uncertainty always lowers aggregate hours of work and increases
expected wage rate in competitive labour markets provided workers are risk averse. Floden
(2006) examines ways in which labour supply can be used to self-insure against labour
income uncertainty. At the empirical level, Low (2005) finds that younger workers with
higher uncertainty over income, work longer hours than old workers and Parker et. al.
(2005) finds that self-employed workers, facing higher uncertainty, work longer hours as
well. However, this response of labour supply to uncertainty is for self-insurance purposes
and the longer work hours come at the expense of lower average wages.

2

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2007

3

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 158 [2007]

take new entrepreneurial activity and reduce poverty but this alternative also
faces a number of problems (Morduch (2006) and Morduch (1999b)). Chetty
and Looney (2006) show that even when we observe smooth consumption
patterns in low income countries, social insurance could be beneficial since
in many cases "...the smoothness of consumption is the result of high risk
aversion and not eﬃcient private insurance markets." (Chetty and Looney
(2006), p. 2352)
At the theoretical level, Varian (1980) views redistributive taxation as
social insurance. Redistributive taxation does not only generate a more equitable income distribution but it also improves the allocation of risk bearing.
Taxing uncertain income, transfers some of the risk to the budget constraint
and when risks are idiosyncratic in nature, the aggregate tax revenue becomes certain which can be re-distributed back to individuals in the form
of lump sum transfers. A green tax reform policy that uses pollution tax
revenues to reduce further the labour tax could exacerbate the social insurance system especially in developing nations where the role of labour taxes
is limited.2 Therefore, the analysis of green tax reforms under uncertainty
could contribute to the debate on the double dividend hypothesis, especially
in the case of developing countries, where, apart from the high income uncertainty, policy makers have to address significant and growing environmental
problems.
The interdependency of environmental taxes with other existing taxes
was first examined by Sandmo (1975). However, it was not until the early
90s, that the proposal to use environmental taxation revenues in reducing
labour income taxes appeared in the literature. Since labor income taxation
is distortionary under certainty, its reduction yields a positive welfare eﬀect
which has been termed the revenue recycling eﬀect (see for example, Oates
(1993) and (1995), Pearce (1991), Repetto et al. (1992)). However, increases
in environmental taxes lead to higher prices, and thus, to a reduction in real
wages yielding a negative welfare eﬀect which has been termed as the taxinteraction term. Because of the increase in prices, the incentive to work may
fall even though labor income taxation is reduced. The overall eﬀect depends
on the departure of the existing taxes from their optimum.3 If the green
tax reform moves existing taxes towards their optimum, there is a “gross
2

As noted by Bird and Zolt (2005), even in the current tax systems of developing countries, the personal income tax system plays a small role in redistributing income and providing social insurance. Furthermore, many developing countries use currently environmental
taxes to generate revenue for environmental investments instead of reducing labour taxes
(Bluﬀstone (2003)).
3
Ballard, Goddeeris and Kim (2005) have shown that the existence of a second dividend
also depends on the specification of the preferences’ structure. See also Kim (2002).
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benefit” and the green tax reform yields a double dividend. That is, there is
a welfare benefit in addition to the expected environmental benefit which is
termed as the Pigouvian eﬀect. The Pigouvian eﬀect measures the reduction
in the consumption of the polluting good due to the marginal increase in
the environmental tax, multiplied by the marginal social benefit (marginal
environmental damage minus the tax ). However, it has been shown that,
under certain reasonable assumptions, the tax-interaction tends to dominate
the revenue recycling eﬀect, and therefore, there is a "gross cost".4 In such
cases, the sign of the total welfare eﬀect depends on the magnitude of the
Pigouvian eﬀect relative to the “gross cost”. Regardless of whether a second
dividend emerges or not, environmental taxes or auctioned permits have an
advantage over grandfathered permits if the revenues are used to reduce
distortionary taxes.5
The green tax reform literature has also examined the eﬀect of revenue
recycling policies on equity and unemployment.6 The literature indicates
that green tax reform could possibly reduce involuntary unemployment. In
terms of equity, it has been shown that a green tax reform can adversely
aﬀect the income distribution, reducing the possibility of achieving a second
dividend.7 Apart from equity considerations, another reason that justify
labor income taxation is the provision of social insurance. Eaton and Rosen
(1980a) have shown that, when there is uncertainty over labor income and
individuals are risk averse, a tax on labor income is optimal, even in the
presence of lump sum taxation, since it reduces uncertainty. Therefore, a
combination of uniform lump sum taxation and labor income taxation is
optimal. Furthermore, Eaton and Rosen (1980b) find that under uncertainty
it is optimal to increase the progressivity of the tax system. Despite the
criticism that this line of work has received,8 it is clear that labor income
4

See Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) and (1997), Bovenberg and Goulder (1996), Goulder (1995) and (1996) , Parry (1995) and (1996), Christiansen (1996) and Goulder, Parry
and Burtraw (1997). See also the literature review papers by Goulder (1995) and Bovenberg (1999).
5
See the recent study by Parry (2003).
6
Bovenberg (1999) and De-Mooij (2000) provide extended reviews of the literature on
equity issues.
7
More recently Layard (2006) argues that income taxation could have a corrective
aspect, assuming that people put excessive work eﬀort in an attempt to increase their
income relative to the average. Assuming that individuals’ utility decreases on average
income, the optimal income tax is positive.
8
For example Lundholm (1992), critised Eaton and Rosen’s (1980b) assumption that
consumers are (ex ante) homogeneous. According to Lundholm, under this assumption
the tax is a substitute for market insurance. Instead, Lundholm argued that consumers
should diﬀer in productivity type.
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taxation is not completely distortionary under labor income uncertainty.
Although the literature has examined the eﬀects of the green tax reform
on equity and unemployment issues, to the best of our knowledge, there is
no work examining the welfare eﬀects of the green tax reform in the presence
of labour income uncertainty. In the present paper we undertake this task.
The introduction of labour income uncertainty in the model implies that
the government has a role in correcting this distortion, especially when private insurance markets are not complete, or, as in some developing countries,
not even present. Therefore, under uncertainty the tax system —labour income and environmental tax— can play a corrective role by reducing the
dispersion of net income and consumption among individuals. In doing so,
both taxes provide some type of insurance, in addition to their respective
primary roles (collecting revenues to finance the public good and reducing
the environmental externality respectively).
When considering a green tax reform within this framework, one should
take into account its eﬀect on the insurance provision mechanism as well.
In this paper, we mark this eﬀect as social insurance eﬀect. In Section 4,
we decompose this eﬀect into three components. First, the increase in the
pollution tax reduces consumption risk, and thus, adds a positive welfare
eﬀect. Second, the balanced budget reduction of the labour income tax
increases the risk creating thus, a negative welfare eﬀect. The sum of these
two eﬀects is positive if the two consumption goods (one that pollutes and the
other that does not) are equal substitutes for leisure, or the polluting good
is a stronger substitute for leisure. On the contrary, if the polluting good is
a suﬃciently weaker substitute for leisure relative to the non-polluting good,
the net of these two eﬀects on welfare is ambiguous and could be negative.
Third, the reduction of labor income taxation increases income risk and in
doing so it aﬀects the response of labour supply. When the insurance eﬀect
of labour income taxation is added to the income eﬀect on labour supply, the
wedge between the income and the substitution eﬀect is shortened and under
certain conditions, the response of labour supply to labour income taxation
could even become positive. Thus, the marginal cost of labour taxation
weakens or it could even become a marginal welfare benefit, yielding a shift
in the signs of the revenue recycling and tax interaction eﬀects.
The total, not including the Pigouvian, welfare eﬀect of the green tax
reform is ambiguous and depends on the relative substitutability of the dirty
and clean good for leisure and the response of labour supply to a change in the
tax mix. This, in turn, depends on the departure of the initial taxes from
their second best optimum. In Section 5 we show that under uncertainty,
the optimal value of labour income tax is positive even in the presence of
lump-sum taxes, and that the optimal environmental tax exceeds marginal
5
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environmental damages. Optimal taxation is analyzed within a second best
framework. If before the green tax reform labour income tax is above its
optimal level while the environmental tax is below its optimal level, then
a green tax reform could increase welfare. However, the green tax reform
could result in welfare losses if the labor income tax is below its first best
and the environmental tax is close to its first best, assuming that lump-sum
taxes/transfers are also available.9
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the two sections that
follow we specify the model and the structure of households’ decision making.
In Section 4 we examine the interaction between labor and environmental
taxation under uncertainty. In Section 5 we analyze optimal taxation within
a second best framework. Section 6 contains the discussion of results and
concluding remarks.

2

The model

On the production side, we assume that labour is the only input in the
production process of the only two consumption goods D and C. Both
production processes exhibit constant returns to scale and the markets for
both goods are competitive. We normalize units such that the pre-tax prices
of both goods are unity. Good C is assumed to be the environmentally
clean good. Production and consumption of good D generate emissions that
adversely aﬀect the quality
of the environment, π, that is, π = Π(D) with
P
ΠD < 0, where D = Di and Di is household i’s consumption. We further
assume that, in the absence of regulation, firms do not internalize any part
of the externality and that the marginal product of labour in both industries
is independent of environmental quality.
We assume that households face uncertainty over their wages when they
decide on their labour supply. Households face diﬀerent risks, and thus, expost earn diﬀerent wages. P
The wage of household i is denoted by wi , with
the mean wage rate w = ni=1 wi /n = 1 normalized to unity. Among the
reasons explaining wage uncertainty are: households are searching for jobs
but they are not sure which type of job, and thus, what wage, they will get;
households are uncertain about their productivity in the job that they will
find given their investment in human capital; households face the probability
of losing their current jobs in which case there is uncertainty about their
wage at the new job. Uncertainty over labour income may arise also due to
9

In this paper we utilize uniform lump sum transfers and distortionary taxes as a
substitute of market insurance as in the Eaton and Rosen taxation model.
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productivity shocks as well as due to imperfect forecasts of inflation.10 Our
paper concentrates on purely idiosyncratic risks, assuming away aggregate
risks.11 We also assume that the market fails to provide insurance due to
moral hazard considerations.12
The government’s function is threefold; to provide a certain amount of
public good; a certain level of environmental quality; and insurance against
wage uncertainty. To serve these functions, the government uses a proportional tax τ L , on income inclusive of lump sum transfers, a per unit tax
τ D on D, and uniform lump sum transfers/taxes Ω.13 Government’s budget
constraint, expressed in per household terms is:14,15
G = τ L [w(T − l) − Ω] + τ D D + Ω ,

(1)

where G = Gn is the public good per household, T −l is the household’s labour
supply, with l denoting leisure, and T time endowment. w = wn denotes
the mean wage rate of the distribution and D = Dn the mean consumption
level of the dirty good. Although taxes paid by household i are stochastic,16
government’s budget constraint is non-stochastic, since the government pools
together idiosyncratic risks more eﬃciently.17
10

For more details see Eaton and Rosen (1980a)
In the case of aggregate risk, the government could provide social insurance through
intergenerational risk-sharing arrangement. See for example Gordon and Varian (1988)
12
See Arrow (1971), Eaton and Rosen (1980a) and Varian (1980).
13
The labor tax is inclusive of lump sum transfers so that it can be made equivalent to
a uniform tax on both commodities. We assume that non-uniform lump sum taxes are
not feasible.
14
The system can be viewed as a commodity tax on the dirty good τ D and the well
known negative income tax that has two parameters, a constant marginal tax rate τ L and
a lump sum transfer, Ω. A negative income tax system is progressive in the sense that
average tax rate rises with gross income.
15
One has to be aware that lump sum transfers and high labor taxes could aﬀect adversely the participation rate into the labor market. See Moﬃt (1992) for a literature
review of the eﬀects of the U.S. welfare system on work incentives.
16
Household i pays taxes Ti = τ D Di∗ + τ L [wi (T − l∗ ) − Ω]. The superscript ∗ denotes
household’s optimal choices as functions of the tax structure and household’s wage rate.
The tax revenue each individual pays is stochastic since it depends on the random wage
rate.
17
The (strong) law of large numbers guarantees certainty at the aggregate level. The
P
P
2
var(wi ) = σn as the number of households
variance of w is equal to var( wi /n) = n12
increases (n increases), the variance of w approaches zero.
11

7
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3

Individual Decision Making Process

We assume the following structure regarding households’ decision making
process. Before the realization of the state of nature, households are called
to allocate their time endowment between labour and leisure. After uncertainty is resolved, households make their consumption choices. Households
solve first the ex-post problem of demand derivation, and then, taking into
account the demand for good C and D, they solve their ex-ante labour supply
problem. Allowing households to make their decisions in two stages, eliminates the possibility of violating ex post the budget constraint due to wage
uncertainty.

3.1

Ex Post Decisions

Given households ex-ante labor supply decision T − l, and the ex post wage
rate wi , the optimal choices of goods D and C are derived from the utility
maximization problem. Assuming separability between public goods (environmental quality and consumption of the public good) and private choices
(of D, C and l), households’ utility is,
u = U(D, C, l) + V (Π(nD), nG) .

(2)

The assumption of separability between public goods and private choices,
allow us to derive the labour supply response to the change in the tax mix
without considering changes in the environmental quality. If however, environmental quality is not separable from leisure and an improvement in
environmental quality stimulates labor supply, then a green tax reform is
more likely to create a second dividend. On the other hand, if environmental
quality and leisure are complements, then a green tax reform will have larger
adverse eﬀects on labour supply and the likelihood of a second dividend diminishes. See for example, Schwartz and Repetto (1997). Since the focus
of this paper is to analyze the eﬀects of uncertainty on the double dividend
hypothesis, we adopt the separability assumption following the main body
of the literature. We make the usual assumptions of a twice diﬀerentiable,
strictly concave utility function, U(.) exhibiting decreasing marginal utility
of consumption so that households are risk averse. Each household is subject
to the budget constraint:18
(1 + τ D )D + C = (1 − τ L ) [w(T − l) − Ω] .

(3)

τ
Note that if the labor tax is set at τ L = 1+τ
where τ is a proportional tax on the
two commodities at equal rates it becomes equivalent to a general comsumption tax.
Substituting for τ L yields (1 + τ )(1 + τ D )D + (1 + τ )C = w(T − l) − Ω
18

8
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The first order conditions of households’ constrained utility maximization
problem yield, UD = (1 + τ D )UC . The solution of the first order conditions
yields the optimal consumption choices as functions of the tax rate on labour
income, the tax rate on D, the leisure choice and the observed wage rate, that
is, D = D(τ D , τ L , wi , l, Ω), and C = C(τ D , τ L , wi , l, Ω). Since the demand
functions depend on the wage rate, they diﬀer across individual households.

3.2

Ex Ante Decisions

In the first stage of the game, that is, before the realization of the state of
nature, households derive their optimal choice of labour supply from the maximization of the expected utility function subject to the budget constraint,
C = (1 − τ L ) [w(T − l) − Ω] − (1 + τ D )D. Substituting the two demand functions, derived in the second stage of the problem, into the expected utility
yields,
E(u) = E [U (D(τ D , τ L , wi , l, Ω), C(τ D , τ L , wi , l, Ω), l)] + V (Π(nD), nG) .
The solution of the constrained maximization problem yields the following
first order conditions,19
¸
∙
(1 − τ L )w
= E(Ul ) .
E [UC (1 − τ L )w] = E UD
(4)
(1 + τ D )
The solution of the first order conditions yields the optimal choice of leisure
as a function of the tax rates, that is,
l∗ = l(τ D , τ L , Ω) .

(5)

Finally, we return to the second stage of the game, and substitute the
optimal labour choice into the demand functions to derive the optimal choices
of goods D and C as functions of the tax rates,
D∗ = D(τ D , τ L , Ω, l∗ , w),

C ∗ = C(τ D , τ L , Ω, l∗ , w) .

(6)

Having determined the optimal choices of households as functions of the
tax rates and the uncertain wage rate, we turn in the next section to derive
the welfare eﬀect of a revenue recycling policy.
19

In deriving equation (4), we use the first order condition of the second stage maxi∂D
mization problem, which implies that, E[(UD − (1 + τ D )UC ) ∂D
∂l ] = E(0 ∂l ) = 0.

9
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4

Interaction of labor and environmental taxation under wage uncertainty

We assume that at some initial positive level of τ L and τ D the government
considers a marginal increase in the environmental tax τ D within a revenueneutral policy. The environmental tax is a corrective tax, in the sense that
it internalizes an existing externality. In the absence of uncertainty, the
proportional labour income tax is distortionary in the sense that it changes
the shadow price of leisure. Under certainty, the literature has identified three
eﬀects of the revenue recycling policy. The eﬀect of using the revenue from
the corrective taxation to reduce the distortionary labour income tax within a
revenue-neutral policy, is positive and has been termed the revenue recycling
eﬀect. However, corrective taxation is not equivalent to lump sum taxation
since it results in price increases, and thus, leads to distortions in the labour
market, a negative eﬀect that is termed the tax interaction eﬀect. If the
former eﬀect outweights the latter, environmental taxation generates a double
dividend, that is, an additional positive eﬀect to the intended improvement
in environmental quality, which is termed the Pigouvian eﬀect. However, the
opposite is more likely to be the case as we discussed in the Introduction.
Consider now the case that households do not know with certainty the
return to their labour eﬀort when they make their labour-leisure decisions.
It has been shown that in addition to the distortionary eﬀect associated with
revenue generation, taxation has the positive eﬀect of lowering households’
risks by pooling them across the economy. Thus, changing the tax structure
has an additional eﬀect, hereafter called the social insurance eﬀect.
In order to evaluate the social insurance eﬀect, we need to determine
the total welfare eﬀect of the revenue recycling policy. That is, we want
to account for the direct eﬀect that a change in the environmental tax has
on households’ optimal choices, as well as the indirect eﬀect generated by
the decrease in labour income tax implied by the revenue recycling policy.
We proceed by deriving the total change in τ L by totally diﬀerentiating
government’s budget constraint, equation (1). Since we consider a revenue
neutral policy we set dG = 0, and dΩ = 0 and we obtain:
∗

)
dD
D + τ D dτ
+ τ L ∂(T∂τ−l
dτ L
D
D
=−
∗ ,
dτ D
(T − l∗ ) − Ω + τ L ∂(T −l )

(7)

∂τ L

∂D
∂D dτ L
+ ∂τ
is the total balanced budget eﬀect of the revenue
where, dτdDD = ∂τ
D
L dτ D
recycling policy on the dirty good. Assuming that the direct dominates the
dD
indirect eﬀect, dτ
< 0. The sign of the relative marginal tax revenue from
D

10
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the environmental tax (numerator) to labour income tax (denominator) is
dτ L
positive, that is, dτ
< 0.
D
We combine the household’s and government’s budget constraints from
equations (1) and (3), in which we substitute the household’s optimal choices,
D∗ , C ∗ and l∗ to obtain its resource constraint,
D∗ + C ∗ + G = w(T − l∗ ) − τ L (w − 1)(T − l∗ ) − τ D (D − D) .

(8)

Household’s resource constraint is stochastic since it depends on w. The
above resource constraint reveals that the government is capable of absorbing
risk at a less cost than the individuals. Thus, households face less risk when
making their labour decisions. Consider a household that gets a bad draw,
that is, w < w. In the presence of labor taxation, the tax acts as an insurance
mechanism in that the individual’s income is more than it would be without
the labor tax system in place, as the second term in the RHS of (8) indicates.
In addition, the bad draw will also reduce consumption of the dirty good
below the average consumption level, that is, D < D, as the third term in
the RHS of (8) indicates and the household will again be better oﬀ relative
to the income level without the tax system. The opposite is true for the
households that get a lucky draw. The tax structure reduces the dispersion
of net income and consumption.20
Households are assumed to maximize their expected utility. Substituting households’ optimal choices into the expected utility yields households’
expected indirect utility
E(W ) = E [U (D∗ , C ∗ , l∗ )] + V (Π(nD), nG) .
We can now derive the total eﬀect of the revenue recycling policy by
diﬀerentiating the expected indirect utility function with respect to the en)
vironmental tax, that is, by specifying the sign of the expression, dE(W
=
dτ D
0

∂E(W )
∂τ D

) dτ L
ΠD
+ ∂E(W
. We define μD = −nV
as the marginal disutility from
∂τ L dτ D
E(UC )
increasing the consumption of the dirty good per unit of expected marginal
utility of the clean good, which for simplicity we term as the marginal exter20

Furthermore, since prior to uncertainty being resolved individuals have the same skills
and opportunities, labor taxes satisfy horizontal equity. Ex post individuals’ income diﬀers
due to luck and thus, there is ex post inequity. However, given that lump sum transfers
are available, lucky individuals have a higher average tax bill, while unlucky individuals
have a lower average tax bill. This implies that the lucky individuals finance a relatively
larger fraction of the public good.

11
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nal damage under uncertainty, and we derive,21
1 dE(W )
dD
cov [UC , D∗ ]
+
= (τ D − μD )
−
E(UC ) dτ D
dτ D
E(UC )
dD
∂(T − l∗ )
] + [1 + ρ] τ L
,
ρ[D + τ D
dτ D
∂τ D

(9)

where ρ is the marginal welfare change due to labour taxation per dollar of
revenue raised which is defined in the following equation22
ρ=

(T −
|

cov[UC ,w](T −l∗ )
E(UC )
∗
∗
l ) − Ω + τ L ∂(T∂τ−lL )

{z
ρ1

}

+

−τ L ∂(T∂τ−lL

∗)

∗ .
(T − l∗ ) − Ω + τ L ∂(T∂τ−lL )
|
{z
}

(10)

ρ2

The denominator of (10) is the partial equilibrium change in government’s
revenue due to a marginal change in the labour wage tax rate.23 The numerator is the welfare change from a marginal change in τ L .24
In the absence of uncertainty, welfare changes because labour-leisure decisions are aﬀected and the labour income tax is distortionary. Under uncertainty, welfare also changes due to the impact of the policy on the insurance
system. The welfare eﬀect of the change in the social insurance system, arising from the change in labor taxation, is captured by the second term in
equation (9) as well as by changes in ρ.
We examine first the eﬀect that the induced changes of the insurance
system have on ρ. First, since labor taxation falls as a result of the revenue
recycling policy, the social insurance eﬀect due to the absorption of income
risk weakens. This is indicated by the covariance term in the numerator of
ρ, which is negative, that is, cov [UC , w] < 0, which implies that ρ1 < 0.
Second, the value of ρ2 depends on the response of labour supply to a
∗
change in τ L , that is, on the sign of ∂(T∂τ−lL ) . Under certainty, the response
of households’ choice of leisure to a decrease in labor taxation can be decomposed into an income and a substitution eﬀect. When labor taxation
decreases, after-tax income increases and thus, households move toward a
21

For some details in the derivation of (9) see Appendix 1.
In the case of certainty, ρ collapses to ρ2 which equals the M term in Goulder et al.
(1997), page 712, equation (14).
23
It is a partial equilibrium eﬀect due to the omission of the eﬀect of labour taxation on
the dirty good. This eﬀect is included in the total eﬀect of the policy on the dirty good.
24
Note that within this framework of tax incidence analysis we examine uncompensated
changes, that is, we consider both income and substitution eﬀects. Thus, the term welfare
changes is used within this framework.
22
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higher level of leisure. At the same time though, the shadow price of leisure
increases, and as a result, households substitute away from leisure. Thus, the
overall eﬀect depends on the relative strength of the income and substitution
eﬀects. Within a framework very similar to the one considered in the present
paper, Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) show that the substitution dominates
∗
the income eﬀect, that is, ∂(T∂τ−lL ) < 0, if the elasticity of substitution between
leisure and consumption is greater than one.25 Under this assumption, there
is a marginal welfare cost due to labor income taxation, that is, ρ2 > 0.
Under uncertainty, labour income taxation is not by definition sub-optimal
and the eﬀect of labor taxation on labour supply has been shown to critically
depend on a number of parameters. A decrease in τ L increases uncertainty
which may induce households to choose a higher level of leisure. When this
insurance eﬀect is added to the income eﬀect, the likelihood that households
increase their labour supply in response to an increase in τ L is enhanced.
The theoretical literature asserts that an increase in wage uncertainty reduces labor supply especially at low initial levels of taxation.26 Eaton and
Rosen (1980a) and (1980b) show that the labour supply response depends on
the relative risk aversion and the share of labor income in consumption expenditure. When labor income is the main source of income, the assumption
of moderate relative risk aversion just above unity suﬃces for labor taxation
to stimulate labor supply. Within the framework of the present paper we
derive similar results. In Appendix 2 we show that, assuming separability
between the choices of leisure and the consumption goods, the response of
labor supply to an increase in the labour tax is positive if the household’s
relative risk aversion parameter exceeds unity, and the after
tax income elas∂(T −l∗ )
ticity for good D is low. In such cases, that is when ∂τ L > 0, an increase
in τ L unambiguously yields a marginal welfare benefit, i.e. ρ2 < 0.
∗
Therefore, in the presence of uncertainty, ρ1 < 0, while ρ2 ≷ 0 if ∂(T∂τ−lL ) ≶
0. A suﬃcient condition for ρ = ρ1 + ρ2 < 0 is that ∂(T∂τ−lL
¯
¯ ¯
¯
¯ cov[UC ,w](T −l∗ ) ¯ ¯ ∂(T −l∗ ) ¯
necessary condition is that ¯
¯ > ¯τ L ∂τ L ¯.
E(UC )
Note that under uncertainty, 1 + ρ =

∗)

> 0 and the

cov[UC ,w](T −l∗ )
E(UC )
∂(T −l∗ )
(T −l∗ )−Ω+τ L ∂τ
L

(T −l∗ )−Ω+

equals the

25

See Hausman J.A. (1985) for evidence on an upward sloping labour supply curve.
Recently, Menezes and Wang (2005) were able to separate the increased wage uncertainty into an income and a substitution eﬀect. They found that an increase in wage uncertainty has a positive income eﬀect on labour supply because increased wage uncertainty
reduces the certainty equivalent income (assuming leisure is normal). The substitution effect of an increase in wage uncertainty reduces labour supply reflecting the worker’s desire
to decrease uncertainty. Under plausible assumptions on risk aversion they find that the
negative substitution eﬀect is stronger than the income eﬀect.
26
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marginal cost of public funds (MCPF). Under certainty, in the absence of
externalities (τ ∗D = 0), and assuming that lump sum taxes are available, revenue raised for public good provision does not require distortionary taxation
(τ L = 0). In such case, the MCPF equals unity. In case that labor income
∗
taxation is used (τ L > 0) and assuming ∂(T∂τ−lL ) < 0, then MCP F > 1. This
result is supported by a large body of literature in public finance.27
While the main body of the literature assumes that labour income taxes
are completely distortionary, some authors have incorporated into the analysis a measure of the distributional gains from labour income taxation.28
Sandmo (1998) argued that the MCPF should not only reflect the eﬃciency
losses of taxes due to the distortions they inflict on markets but also the distributional gains obtained. Sandmo showed, in a model with heterogeneous
agents, that if the distributional gains are taken into account, the MCPF
figure could be less than unity.
In a similar manner, the present paper shows that, in the presence of
uncertainty, if the gains from providing insurance are considered, MCPF
could also be less than unity. The suﬃcient and necessary conditions for
MCP F < 1 are the same as those yielding ρ < 0.
The above discussion regarding the value of ρ has important implications
on both the revenue recycling and the tax interaction eﬀects as it is evident
from equation (9). If ρ < 0 then, contrary to the case of certainty, the
revenue recycling eﬀect is negative (third term in equation (9)). However,
the overall increase in revenue exceeds the marginal welfare benefit implying
that −1 < ρ < 0 and (1 + ρ) > 0. Furthermore, since the pollution tax
also acts as an insurance device, labor supply might be also stimulated from
the increase in the environmental tax, in which case the tax interaction term
alternates in sign relative to the case of certainty.29 Finally, the increase
in the pollution tax generates a reduction in consumption risk and hence an
additional positive welfare eﬀect as we noted in discussing equation (8). This
welfare eﬀect
£ is¡ captured
¢¤ by the second term in equation (9). The covariance
∗
term cov UC , D − D under risk aversion is negative and thus, welfare
increases as a result of increased environmental taxation.30
The extent to which a second dividend is realized under uncertainty, depends on the relative magnitude of the three eﬀects we examined above. We
now proceed to compare these eﬀects. Substituting ρ = ρ1 + ρ2 and using the
27

Ballard and Fullerton (1992) oﬀers a comprehensive review of the literature. See also
Hausman (1985) on the empirical evidence of taxation and labour supply.
28
See for example Wilson (1991), Dalby (1998) and Sandmo (1998).
29
See Appendix 2 for the conditions under which this possibility arises.
30
Risk aversion implies UCC < 0. Thus, as D∗ increases due to a positive state of nature
so does C ∗ assuming normal goods and as a result UC falls.
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value of the total induced change in τ L from equation (7), the sum of the tax
interaction and revenue raising eﬀects (the last two terms in equation (9))
can be written:

−

cov [UC , w] (T − l∗ ) dτ L
dD
∂(T − l∗ )
+ ρ2 [D + τ D
] + [1 + ρ2 ] τ L
.
E(UC )
dτ D
dτ D
∂τ D

(11)

The first term shows the decrease in insurance benefits arising from the labour
income tax reduction. Since the variability of the consumption of the dirty
good arises from the variability of the wage rate, the two covariance terms can
be connected more closely. In order to get more insight into the covariance
eﬀects (first term in equation (11) and second term in equation (9)), assume
that the consumption of the dirty good is a linear function of the individual’s
income level, namely: Di∗ = β[wi (T − l∗ ) − Ω], where β is the marginal
propensity to consume the dirty good out of gross labour income.31 Then,
¶
µ
cov [UC , w] (T − l∗ )
cov [UC , D∗ ] cov [UC , w] (T − l∗ ) dτ L
dτ L
.
=−
−
−
β+
E(UC )
E(UC )
dτ D
E(UC )
dτ D
(12)
The two covariance terms capture the social insurance eﬀects resulting
∗
from the green tax reform under uncertainty, except from the eﬀect on ∂(T∂τ−lL ) .
Therefore, these social insurance eﬀects are positive if the propensity to consume the dirty good out of gross labour income is greater than the balance
budget reduction in the labour¯ tax¯ arising from a marginal increase in the
¯ dτ L ¯
Pigouvian tax, that is, iﬀ β > ¯ dτ
¯.
D
dτ L
As shown in appendix 3, we can express the term β + dτ
in elasticity
D
form,
h
i
τL
dD
µ
¶
c
c
c
D D,(1−τ ) − sD D,(1−τ ) − sC C,(1−τ ) − τ D dτ
(1−τ L )
dτ L
D
L
L
L
β+
=
,
∗)
∂(T
−l
∗
dτ D
(T − l ) − Ω + τ L ∂τ L
(13)
c
where, D(1−τ ) is the compensated elasticity of demand for the dirty good
L
with respect to the price of leisure, cC,(1−τ ) is similarly the elasticity of deL
mand for the clean good with respect to the price of leisure. Furthermore,
sD = [(T −lD∗ )−Ω] and sC = [(T −lC∗ )−Ω] are the shares of the dirty and clean good

respectively in income including lump-sum transfers. given that

dD
dτ D

< 0,

31

This is a reasonable assumption since most standard type of utility functions yield
linear relationships with income. Also β would depend on the value of the labour tax and
the Pigouvian tax.
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a suﬃcient hcondition
i for the social insurance eﬀect to be positive is that
C
c
≥ C+G−Ω cC,(1−τ ) .32 If G > Ω, that is if the public good is not
D,(1−τ L )
L
financed entirely by lump-sum taxes, the social insurance eﬀect is unambiguously positive if D is not a very weak substitute for leisure relative to C.
In such cases, the social insurance eﬀect from increased τ D dominates the
decrease in social insurance provision due to the balanced budget reduction
in τ L . If D is a suﬃciently weak substitute for leisure, the social insurance
dD
eﬀect could be negative depending on the magnitude of dτ
.
D
∗

)
dD
] + [1 + ρ2 ] τ L ∂(T∂τ−l
,
The last two terms in equation (11), ρ2 [D + τ D dτ
D
D
present the sum of the tax interaction and revenue raising eﬀects as in the
case of certainty. Following similar steps as in Goulder et al (1997) we can
write the tax interaction eﬀect as,

[1 + ρ2 ] τ L

∂(T − l∗ )
= −Dρ2 φD ,
∂τ D

where,
c
D,1−τ L

φD = φD = h
sD

c
D,1−τ L

+

−

T −l∗
Ω

sC cC,1−τ
L

(14)

T −l∗ Ω

−

T −l∗
Ω

T −l∗ Ω

i .,

(15)

".... is a measure of the degree of substitutability between the dirty good
and leisure relative to to that between aggregate consumption and leisure."
(Goulder et al (1997), p. 713). Substituting expressions (11), (12), (13), (14)
and (15) into equation (9) yields,
¶
µ
dτ L
dD
cov [UC , w] (T − l∗ )
1 dE(W )
β+
= (τ D − μD )
−
+
E(UC ) dτ D
dτ D
E(UC )
dτ D
|
{z
} |
{z
}
P

SI

dD
.
(1 − φD )ρ2 D + ρ2 τ D
dτ D
|
{z
}
RR+T I

For
dτ L
β+ dτ
D

c
D,(1−τ L )

>

h

C
C+G−Ω

i

c
,
C,(1−τ L )

from equations (13) and (15) we have

> 0 and φD > 1. Therefore, if D is not substantially weaker substitute
for leisure relative to C, the social insurance eﬀect is positive SI > 0 and the
32

To derive this condition, substitute the values of sD and sC into the first term in the
∗
∗
numerator of (13) and use the expected resource constraint D + C + G = T − l∗ . In the
first best world where the public good is financed entirely by lump-sum taxes (G = Ω) the
condition holds as an equality cD,(1−τ ) = cC,(1−τ ) .
L

L
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sum of the revenue recycling and tax interaction eﬀects is negative (RR +
T I < 0) assumingh ρ2 > 0,iwhile it is positive (RR+T I > 0) assuming ρ2 < 0.
dτ L
C
c
If cD,(1−τ ) = C+G−Ω
, then β+ dτ
= 0 and φD = 1. In this case
C,(1−τ L )
D
L
and assuming we start with τ D > 0, then the social insurance eﬀect is positive
(SI>0), while the sum of the revenue recycling and tax interaction eﬀects is
negative (RR + T I < 0) assuming ρ2 > 0, while it is positive (RR + T I > 0)
assuming ρ2 < 0. Therefore, if ρ2 < 0 there is a¯ second dividend,
¯ ¯ while ¯if
¯ cov[UC ,w](T −l∗ ) ¯ ¯ ∂(T −l∗ ) ¯
ρ2 > 0 the existence of a second dividend requires ¯
¯ > ¯ ∂τ L ¯.
E(UC )
Assuming τ D = 0, the Pigouvian is the only welfare eﬀect of the green tax
reform since RR + ThI = SI i= 0.
dτ L
C
c
For cD,(1−τ ) < C+G−Ω
, we have β + dτ
< 0 and φD < 1.
C,(1−τ L )
D
L
When D is "suﬃciently" weak substitute for leisure and τ D = 0, the social
insurance eﬀect is negative, SI < 0 and the sum of the revenue recycling and
tax interaction eﬀects is positive (RR + T I > 0) assuming ρ2 > 0, while it is
negative (RR + T I < 0) assuming ρ2 < 0. For τ D > 0 but relatively small,
the signs of the three eﬀects remain the same as long as the direct dominates
the indirect eﬀect in the numerator of equation (13) and in the RR + T I
term.

MCPF-1 SI eﬀect RR+IT eﬀect h Total eﬀect
i
C
c
Case 1: Welfare eﬀect if D,(1−τ ) > C+G−Ω cC,(1−τ
L

ρ2 < 0
ρ2 > 0

+
+

Case 2: Welfare eﬀect if
ρ2 < 0
ρ2 > 0

nil
nil

Case 3: Welfare eﬀect if
ρ2 < 0
ρ2 > 0

+
+

Case 4: Welfare eﬀect if

+
−

c
D,(1−τ L )

=

nil
nil
c
D,(1−τ L )

+
−

c
D,(1−τ L )

=

<

L)

positive
i
h ambiguous
C
C+G−Ω

c
C,(1−τ L )

does not exist
i exist
h does not
C
C+G−Ω

c
C,(1−τ L )

and τ D = 0

and τ D > 0

positive
i
h ambiguous
C
C+G−Ω

c
33
C,(1−τ L )

ρ2 < 0
−
−
negative
ρ2 > 0
−
+
ambiguous
Table 1. Total welfare eﬀect under diﬀerent assumptions about the relative
substitutability of the two goods for leisure.
33

Assuming that in the case τ D > 0, the direct dominates the indirect eﬀect.
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Table 1 below summarizes the above discussion. In summing up, we find
that, in general, the social insurance eﬀect is positive and moves in the same
direction as the sum of the revenue recycling and tax interaction eﬀects if
ρ2 < 0 and D is a relatively strong (or equal) substitute for leisure yielding
a second dividend. If ρ2 > 0 and and D is a relatively strong (or equal)
substitute of leisure there is a "gross cost" in terms of RR + T I but this
can be oﬀset by the opposing social insurance eﬀect. The only case in which
there is a "gross cost" including the social insurance eﬀect is the case that D
is a suﬃciently weak substitute and ρ2 < 0. These results diﬀer substantially
from the case of certainty. The critical parameters determining the existence
of a second dividend are the lump sum transfers, the relative substitutability
of the two goods for leisure and the initial tax rates relative to their optimal
values that determine also the response of labour supply to a change in the
tax mix. In the next section we undertake the task of deriving the optimal
tax rates.

5

Optimal Taxation

In the previous Section we show that, starting from some positive values of
τ L and τ D , the welfare eﬀect of a revenue recycling policy depends on the
magnitude of the departure of the initial values of taxes from their optimal.
The optimal taxes are determined ex ante, that is, before uncertainty is
resolved. Due to the presence of two types of distortions (uncertainty and
environmental externality) we analyze optimal taxation within a second best
framework.
Recall that, within the framework of our model, the government has three
functions, namely to provide the public good, protect the environment, and
provide insurance against wage uncertainty. The government has three instruments: labor income tax, environmental tax and lump sum transfers in
order to achieve the above three goals. Thus, the government chooses τ L,
τ D and Ω to maximize the household’s indirect expected utility subject to
the revenue constraint. The Lagrangian corresponding to the government’s
constrained maximization problem is,
£
¤
max L = E(W (τ D , τ L , Ω)) + λ Ω + τ L [(T − l∗ ) − Ω] + τ D D − G .
τ L ,τ D ,Ω

Assuming an interior solution, the first order conditions yield,34
X
34

∂D
∂(T − l∗ )
cov(UC , D∗ ) ∂R
,
+ τ LΨ
=
∂τ D v=c
∂τ D v=c (1 − τ L )E(UC ) ∂Ω

(16)

For some details leading to these conditions, see Appendix 4.
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∂D
∂(T − l∗ )
cov(UC , w)(T − l∗ ) ∂R
,
(17)
+ τ LΨ
=
∂τ L v=c
∂τ L v=c
(1 − τ L )E(UC ) ∂Ω
h
ii
h
μD ∂D
τ L ∂(T −l∗ )
, and Ψ = 1 + (1−τ
> 0.35 R
where, X = τ D − μD 1 + (1−τ
∂Ω
L)
L ) ∂Ω
is defined as the average tax revenue per person, and the subscript v = c
indicates compensated changes.
Using the above conditions we can determine government’s optimal choices.
As a benchmark case, we first consider the case of certainty. In this case,
and assuming that government has access to lump sum taxes /transfers, the
environmental externality is optimally internalized by a Pigouvian tax. The
revenues from the Pigouvian tax together with the lump sum taxes support the provision of the public good. That is, the optimal tax structure is
τ ∗D = μD , τ ∗L = 0 and τ D D +Ω∗ = G. 36,37
We now return to the case of uncertainty over labour income. In this case
it is optimal to set both labour income and environmental taxes positive, that
is, τ ∗D > 0 and τ ∗L > 0, while raising any additional revenue from lump sum
taxes. Because of the existence of environmental externalities, the optimal
environmental tax is positive,38 and exceeds the marginal external damage,
since the environmental tax is also part of the social insurance mechanism.
1
i < 1, in an optimal
Sandmo (1998) has shown that MCP F = h
τL
∂(T −l∗ )
X

1+ (1−τ

L)

∂Ω

setting. This is also true in the current setting since the MCPF does not
reflect only the eﬃciency loss but it accounts also for the social insurance gain.
As shown in the previous section, MCPF<1. Thus, when public investment
is financed on the margin by uniform lump sum taxes it causes labor supply

35
Following Ng (1980) we make the assumption that Ψ > 0. Ng (1980) notes that, "...Ψ
is positive (though less than one) .... unless the externality is so strong that an increase
in income actually makes the community worse oﬀ." (p. 747).
36
Setting τ ∗D > μD and τ ∗L = 0 cannot satisfy the above conditions since the left hand
side of the first optimal condition is negative at these values. Furthermore, setting τ ∗D =
0 and τ ∗L = 0 and raising all funds from lump sum taxation cannot satisfy the above
conditions since the left hand side of the first two conditions becomes non-zero at these
values. If we set 0 < τ ∗D < μD and τ ∗L > 0 then both conditions cannot be satisfied
simultaneously since X < 0 for all τ ∗D < μD .
37
Note that the double dividend literature was built under the assumption of no lump
sum taxation. In such a case, Bovenberg and De-Mooij (1994) and (1996) argued that
τ D < μD because the marginal cost of public funds is greater than unity. However, as
correctly pointed out by Fullerton (1997) this result stems from the arbitrary normalization
of the clean good’s price to unity.
38
In the absense of externalities, equations (11) and (12) yield τ ∗D = 0 and τ ∗L > 0. The
optimal value of τ ∗L is given by (12) where X = 0 and Ψ = 1. In this case, labour income
taxation —which is equivalent to a uniform commodity tax on both goods— is set optimally
such as to provide social insurance. The remaining required revenues are raised by lump
sum taxes.
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to increase. This increase in labor eﬀort creates an eﬃciency gain in terms of
increased revenue to finance public goods given the existence of an optimal
wage tax. See Sandmo (1998) for a similar analysis. Unfortunately, it is not
possible to derive analytical solution for the optimal tax rates.
After determining the optimal tax rates, the government should compare
the existing tax rates to their optimal values before it decides wether and to
what extent a revenue neutral policy should be implemented. If the initial
tax rates are such that the labor income tax is below its optimal level, while
the environmental tax is equal to its optimal level, a green tax reform policy
will result in welfare losses. On the contrary, if the environmental tax is below
its optimal value and the labour income tax exceeds its optimal value, a case
which is more possible in reality, a green tax reform will improve welfare.

6

Conclusions

The present paper re-examines the double dividend hypothesis in the presence of labour income uncertainty. We find that starting from some positive
level of environmental and labor income taxation and increasing the former
while decreasing the latter within a revenue neutral policy has the following
eﬀects: First, the increase in environmental taxation yields a positive welfare
eﬀect since it reduces consumption risk, in addition to the Pigouvian eﬀect.
Second, the reduction in labor income taxation weakens social insurance provision, while in the same time alleviates some of the distortions in the labour
market. The net eﬀect depends on the relative substitutability of the dirty
and clean good for leisure. If D is (not) a suﬃciently weak substitute for
leisure relative to C the net eﬀect is negative (positive). Third, the reduction
of labor income taxation increases risk and in doing so it aﬀects the response
of labour supply which could even become positive. Thus, the reduction in
labour income tax could yield a marginal welfare benefit, reversing the signs
of the revenue recycling and tax interaction eﬀects. The total welfare eﬀect
of the green tax reform is ambiguous and depends on the relative substitutability of the dirty and clean good for leisure and the response of labour
supply to a change in the tax mix. This, in turn, depends on the departure
of the initial taxes from their second best optimum. We determine that the
optimal value of both environmental and labor taxation is positive. If the
initial level of the labour income tax is above its optimum, that is, there is
overprovision of social insurance, and the environmental tax below its optimum, then a revenue recycling policy will yield a positive welfare eﬀect.
However, a revenue recycling policy will result in welfare losses if the initial
level of labor tax is below its optimum, that is, there is underprovision of
20
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social insurance, while the environmental tax is close or above its optimum.
The lower is labour income tax relative to its optimum, and the closer is
the environmental tax to its optimum, the larger the welfare losses will be,
assuming the availability of lump-sum taxes.
The analysis of the present paper could be extended in diﬀerent directions. Given the ambiguity of the total welfare eﬀect in a number of instances, it would be interesting to use empirical simulations to determine
the sign and the size of the total eﬀect under plausible parameter values.
The literature under certainty shows that grandfathered emission permits
policies yield lower welfare since they do not generate a revenue recycling
eﬀect. It would be interesting to check this result in the case of uncertainty.
Finally, as mentioned in the Introduction, recent empirical literature shows
that it could be possible that higher uncertainty over income induces employees to work longer hours for self-insurance purposes (Low (2005), Parker et
al. (2005) and Floden (2006)). This longer work hours comes at the expense
of lower average wages. In this case, taxation can be seen as a substitute to
self-insurance. Extending our analysis to this direction might provide some
interesting intuition.

7
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8
8.1

Appendices
Appendix 1: Calculations leading to equation (9):

The government chooses τ L, τ D and Ω to maximize the household’s indirect
utility subject to the revenue constraint. That is, the government’s problem
is to maximize,
E(W (τ D , τ L , Ω)) = E(U(D∗ , C ∗ , l∗ )) + V (Π(nD), nG) ,
subject to the government constraint: τ D D + τ L w(T − l∗ ) + (1 − τ L )Ω = G.
The Lagrangian corresponding to the above problem is:
£
¤
L = E(W (τ D , τ L , Ω)) + λ (1 − τ L )Ω + τ L (T − l∗ ) + τ D D − G .

The first order conditions are:

¸
∙
∂L
∂D
∂(T − l∗ )
∂E(W (τ D , τ L , Ω))
=0,
=
+ λ D + τD
+ τL
∂τ D
∂τ D
∂τ D
∂τ D
¸
∙
∂L
∂(T − l∗ )
∂D
∂E(W (τ D , τ L , Ω))
∗
=0,
=
+λ w(T − l ) − Ω + τ L
+ τD
∂τ L
∂τ L
∂τ L
∂τ L
∙
¸
∂L
∂(T − l∗ )
∂D
∂E(W (τ D , τ L , Ω))
=
+ λ 1 − τL + τL
+ τD
=0,
∂Ω
∂Ω
∂Ω
∂Ω
and
¤
∂L £
= (1 − τ L )Ω + τ L (T − l∗ ) + τ D D − G = 0 .
∂λ
Solving the above four equations will yield τ ∗D , τ ∗L and Ω∗ and λ∗. .
Partially diﬀerentiating the indirect utility with respect to the environmental tax yields,
¸
∙
∂E(W )
∂D∗
∂C ∗
∂l∗
∂D
0
+ nV ΠD
= E UD
+ UC
+ Ul
.
∂τ D
∂τ D
∂τ D
∂τ D
∂τ D
From the combined constraint we get,
∂(T − l∗ )
∂D
∂C ∗
∂(T − l∗ )
∂D∗
= (1−τ L )w
+τ L
+τ D
−(D∗ −D)−(1+τ D )
.
∂τ D
∂τ D
∂τ D
∂τ D
∂τ D
Substituting into the indirect utility and utilizing the first order conditions
yields,
¸¸
∙ ∙
∂E(W )
∂(T − l∗ )
∂D
∂D
0
∗
+ nV ΠD
= −E UC (D − D) − τ L
− τD
,
∂τ D
∂τ D
∂τ D
∂τ D
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which can be written as follows,
∂(T − l∗ )
1 ∂E(W )
∂D
cov(UC , (D∗ − D))
+ τL
= (τ D − μD )
−
,
E(UC ) ∂τ D
∂τ D
E(UC )
∂τ D
0

ΠD
is defined as the marginal external damage under unwhere μD = −nV
E(UC )
certainty.
Partially diﬀerentiating the indirect utility with respect to the labour tax
yields,

∂(T − l∗ )
1 ∂E(W )
∂D cov(UC (w − w))(T − l∗ )
= (τ D − μD )
−
.
+ τL
E(UC ) ∂τ L
∂τ L
E(UC )
∂τ L
Partially diﬀerentiating the indirect utility with respect to the lump sum
taxes yields,
∂(T − l∗ )
∂D
1 ∂E(W )
= (τ D − μD )
+ τL
.
E(UC ) ∂Ω
∂Ω
∂Ω
Totally diﬀerentiating the expected utility with respect to the environmental tax we get,
dE(W )
∂E(W ) ∂E(W ) dτ L
=
+
dτ D
∂τ D
∂τ L dτ D
Substituting from the above derived values of
equation (7) into

dE(W )
dτ D

.

∂E(W ) ∂E(W )
, ∂τ L ,
∂τ D

and

dτ L
dτ D

from

yields, after simple manipulations,

¤
£
cov UC , (D∗ − D)
1 dE(W )
∂D
+
= (τ D − μD )
−
E(UC ) dτ D
∂τ D
E(UC )
∂D
∂(T − l∗ )
] + [1 + ρ] τ L
,
ρ[D + τ D
∂τ D
∂τ D
dD
∂D
∂D dτ L
If we substitute dτ
= ∂τ
+ ∂τ
in the above and we collect terms acD
D
L dτ D
cordingly we get equation (9) and the definition of ρ in equation (10).

8.2

Appendix 2: Determination of
signs:

∂(T −l∗ )
∂τ L

and

∂(T −l∗ )
∂τ D

We can determine the eﬀect of an increase in τ L on labor supply by diﬀerentiating the first order condition of the labour supply determination (ex-ante)
problem, equation (4) in the main text,
E [UC (C, D, l)(1 − τ L )w] = E(Ul (C, D, l)) .
27
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From the budget constraint we have that, C = M − (1 + τ D )D, where M
denotes the after tax income, M = (1 − τ L ) [w(T − l∗ ) − Ω)]. Assuming
separability between the choices of leisure and the consumption goods, the
optimal values of the choice variables are D∗ = D(τ D, M), C ∗ = C(τ D, M),
and l∗ = l(τ D , τ L , Ω). The separability assumption reduces the first order
condition to E [UC (C)(1 − τ L )w] = E(Ul (l)), which after substituting the
budget constraint and the optimal values of the choice variables yields,
E [UC [(1 − τ L ) [w(T − l∗ ) − Ω] − (1 + τ D )D∗ ] (1 − τ L )w] = E(Ul (l∗ )) .
Diﬀerentiating the above first order condition with respect to the labor tax
yields,
∙
¸
∂C
∂ (T − l∗ )
−E(UC w) + (1 − τ L )E UCC
w + E(Ull )
=0.
∂τ L
∂τ L
Diﬀerentiating the budget constraint C = M − (1 + τ D )D(τ D , M), with
respect to the labour tax yields,
∂M
∂D ∂M
∂C
=
− (1 + τ D )
=
∂τ L
∂τ L
∂M ∂τ L
∙
¸
¸∙
(1 + τ D )D
∂(T − l∗ )
∗
1−
,
η − [w(T − l ) − Ω] + (1 − τ L )w
M
∂τ L
where η is the after tax income elasticity of good D. Substituting the above
into the first order condition yields,
∙
¸¸
∙∙
¸
∂(T − l∗ )
(1 + τ D )D
2
2
E(Ull ) + (1 − τ L ) E 1 −
η UCC w
M
∂τ L
∙
∙
¸
¸
(1 + τ D )D
∗
= E [UC w] + E UCC w 1 −
n (1 − τ L ) [w(T − l ) − Ω] ,
M
which reduces to,
∗

h
h
h
E UC w 1 − 1 +

∂(T − l )
=
∂τ L
h
hh
where ∆ = E(Ull ) + (1 − τ L )2 E 1 −

(1+τ D )D
(1
C

∆

(1+τ D )D
η
M

i

i ii
− η) R

UCC w2

ii

,

< 0, and R =

− UUCC
C is the relative risk aversion. The response of labor supply to an
C
increase in the labour tax is positive, if R > C+(1+τ DC)D(1−η) . This condition
holds assuming the risk aversion parameter is greater than unity and the
after tax income elasticity for good D is low (that is, η ≤ 1).
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In the case that the after tax income elasticity of the demand for good D
is unity, that is, η = 1 , the sign of the labour supply response to changes in
τ L depends only on the relative risk aversion, as in the case of one good (see
Eaton and Rosen (1980a)). We can illustrate this case using a utility function
Di1−θ
Ci1−θ
of the form, Ui = a1 (1−θ)
+ a2 (1−θ)
+ vl + V (Π(nD), nG), for which η = 1.
Following the same process as above, we derive,
∗

∂(T −l∗ )
∂τ L

= (1 − θ) E[U∆C w] > 0.

Therefore, in this case ∂(T∂τ−lL ) > 0 if R = θ > 1.
We now turn to derive the response of labour supply to changes in the environmental tax. Diﬀerentiating the above first order condition with respect
to τ D yields,
∙
¸
∂C
∂ (T − l)
E UCC
(1 − τ L )w + E(Ull (
)) = 0 .
∂τ D
∂τ D
Diﬀerentiating the budget constraint C = M − (1 + τ D )D(τ D , M), with
respect to the environmental tax yields,
¶
µ
∂C
∂M
∂D
∂D ∂M
=
=
− D − (1 + τ D )
+
∂τ D
∂τ D
∂τ D ∂M ∂τ D
µ
¶
∂(T − l∗ )
∂D
∂D
1 − (1 + τ D )
− D − (1 + τ D )
.
(1 − τ L )w
∂τ D
∂M
∂τ D
Substituting the above into the first order condition and after simple manipulations yields,
³
´i
h
(1+τ D ) ∂D
D
E UC wR C 1 + D ∂τ D
∂(T − l∗ )
= −(1 − τ L )
,
∂τ D
∆
where the first term within the expected value in the nominator is positive,
∂D
while the second term is negative assuming that ∂τ
< 0 for all states of naD
ture. Thus,

∂(T −l∗ )
∂τ D

S 0 if the elasticity of the dirty good with respect to the

∂D
D)
price of the good is (1+τ
S −1. In the example of constant relative
D
∂(1+τ D )
risk aversion we used above, the response of labour supply to changed in τ D
∗)
E [UC w D
C]
is, ∂(T∂τ−l
=
−(1
−
τ
)(θ
−
1)
. In this case, the sign of the response
L
∆
D
of labour supply to changes in the environmental tax depends solely on the
∂D
D∗
value of R, since ∂τ
= − 1θ (1+τ
or the price elasticity of demand for the
D
D)
∗

)
D ) ∂D
dirty good which is (1+τ
= − 1θ > −1 if θ = R > 1. Thus ∂(T∂τ−l
> 0,
D
∂τ D
D
that is the insurance role of environmental taxation has a positive eﬀect on
labour supply when individuals have a moderate relative risk aversion parameter.
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8.3

dτ L
Appendix 3. Derivation of (β + dτ
) and φD
D

Substituting the following Slutsky equations,
∂(T − l∗ )
D
D
∂D
∂(T − l∗ )
∂(T − l∗ )
∂(T − l∗ )
=
,
=
+
+
∂τ D
∂τ D v=c (1 − τ L )
∂Ω
∂τ L v=c (1 − τ L )
∂Ω
and

∂(T − l∗ )
[(T − l∗ ) − Ω] ∂(T − l∗ )
∂(T − l∗ )
,
=
+
∂τ L
∂τ L v=c
(1 − τ L )
∂Ω

into the expression (β +
equation (7), yields,

dτ L
),
dτ D

and using the the expression for

∗
∙
¸
∂D
dD
βτ L ∂(T∂τ−lL ) v=c − τ L ∂τ
− τ D dτ
dτ L
L v=c
D
β+
=
.
∂(T −l∗ )
∗
dτ D
(T − l ) − Ω + τ L

dτ L
dτ D

from

((A3.1))

∂τ L

Expressing the first two terms on the numerator of (A3.1) in elasticity
form, yields,
h
i
τ LD
T −l∗
dD
¸
∙
c
D,1−τ L − T −l∗ −Ω T −l∗ ,1−τ L − τ D dτ D
(1−τ L )
dτ L
=
,
((A3.2))
β+
∗
dτ D
(T − l∗ ) − Ω + τ L ∂(T −l )
∂τ L

∂D
L)
where, cD,τ = (1−τ
is the compensated elasticity of demand
∂(1−τ L ) v=c
D
L
for the dirty good with respect to the price of leisure (1-τ L ) and is positive if the dirty good and leisure are substitutes. Similarly cT −l∗ ,1−τ L =
(1−τ L ) ∂(T −l∗ )
> 0 is the compensated price elasticity of the individual’s
(T −l∗ ) ∂(1−τ L ) v=c
labour supply with respect to the price of leisure.
Diﬀerentiating the expected resource constraint: D + C + G = (T − l∗ )
with respect the labour taxation while holding utility constant we get:

∂D
∂C
∂ (T − l∗ )
=
+
.
∂τ L v=c ∂τ L v=c ∂τ L v=c

((A3.3))

Multiplying through by (1−τ L ) and expressing these in elasticity form yields,
c
T −l∗ ,τ L

=

D
T − l∗

c
Dτ L

+

C
T − l∗

c
Cτ L

.

((A3.4))

dτ L
Substituting this into the expression β + dτ
in equation (A3.2), yields equaD
tion (15) in the main body of the paper.
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In a similar way we can express in elasticity form
the tax interaction eﬀect,
∗)
as defined in equation (9), T I = (1 + ρ2 )τ L ∂(T∂τ−l
.
Simple manipulations of
D
the definition of ρ2 yield,
(1 + ρ2 ) τ L = −

ρ2 [(T − l∗ ) − Ω]

.

∂(T −l∗ )
∂τ L

Substituting this into the definition of the tax interaction eﬀect yields,
∂(T −l∗ )
∂τ D
∂(T −l∗ )
∂τ L

∗

T I = −ρ2 [(T − l ) − Ω]

,

Utilizing the Slutsky equations from above yields,
i
h
∂(T −l∗ )
∂D
D
+
∂τ L v=c
(1−τ L )
∂Ω
i.
T I = −ρ2 [(T − l∗ ) − Ω] h
∂(T −l∗ )
[(T −l∗ )−Ω] ∂(T −l∗ )
+ (1−τ L )
∂τ L v=c
∂Ω
The above expression can be written in elasticity format:

T I = −ρ2 D h

h

c
D,1−τ L

−

T −l∗
T −l∗ ,Ω
Ω

(T −l∗ )
c
[(T −l∗ )−Ω] T −l∗ ,1−τ L

−

i

T −l∗
T −l∗ ,Ω
Ω

i.

where T −l∗ Ω is the elasticity of labour supply with respect to lump sum
taxation.
D
C
c
c
Substituting cT −l∗ ,1−τ L = T −l
+ T −l
into T I in equation
∗ D,1−τ
∗ C,1−τ
L
L
(A3.6) yields,

or,

T I = −ρ2 D h

c
D,1−τ L
D
c
[T −l∗ −Ω] D,1−τ L

+

−

T −l∗
Ω

T −l∗ Ω

C
c
[T −l∗ −Ω] C,1−τ L

−

T −l∗
Ω

T −l∗ Ω

i,

T I = −ρ2 DφD ,
where,
φD = h

c
D,1−τ L
D
c
[T −l∗ −Ω] D,1−τ L

+

−

T −l∗
Ω

T −l∗ Ω

C
c
[T −l∗ −Ω] C,1−τ L

−

T −l∗
Ω

T −l∗ Ω

i.
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8.4

Appendix 4. Calculations leading to equations
(16) and (17):

The first order conditions of the government’s constrained maximization
problem with respect to τ L and Ω yield,
∗
cov(UC ,wl∗ )
+ τ L ∂(T∂τ−lL )
E(UC )
−l∗ )
μD ) ∂D
+ τ L ∂(T∂Ω
∂Ω

∂D
−
(τ D − μD ) ∂τ
L

(τ D −

=

∂R
∂τ L
∂R
∂Ω

,

where R denotes the average tax revenue per person. This expression can be
written as follows,
¸
∙
∂D
∂D
∗
(τ D − μD ) (1 − τ L )
− [(T − l ) − Ω]
∂τ L
∂Ω
∙
¸
∗
∂(T − l ) ∂D
∂(T − l∗ ) ∂D
− μD τ L
−
∂Ω
∂τ L
∂τ L ∂Ω
∙
¸
∗
∂(T − l )
∂(T − l∗ )
∗
− [(T − l ) − Ω]
+ τ L (1 − τ L )
∂τ L
∂Ω
∗
cov(UC , w)(T − l ) ∂R
= 0 ((A4.1))
−
E(UC )
∂Ω
The total eﬀects of a change in labor taxation on the dirty good and labor
supply are,
∂D
∂D
[(T − l∗ ) − Ω] ∂D
,
=
+
∂τ L
∂τ L v=c
(1 − τ L ) ∂Ω
and
∂(T − l∗ )
[(T − l∗ ) − Ω] ∂(T − l∗ )
∂(T − l∗ )
,
=
+
∂τ L
∂τ L v=c
(1 − τ L )
∂Ω
respectively. The subscript v = c indicates compensated changes. Substituting these values into equation (A4.1) yields,
∙
∙
¸¸
τ L ∂(T − l∗ )
∂D
τ D − μD 1 +
(1 − τ L )
∂Ω
∂τ L v=c
∙
¸
∗
μD ∂D ∂(T − l )
cov(UC , w)(T − l∗ ) ∂R
. ((A4.2))
+ τL 1 +
=
(1 − τ L ) ∂Ω
∂τ L v=c
(1 − τ L )E(UC ) ∂Ω
The first order conditions of the government’s constrained maximization
problem with respect to τ D and Ω yield,
∗)
cov(UC ,D∗ )
+ τ L ∂(T∂τ−l
E(UC )
D
∂(T −l∗ )
∂D
μD ) ∂Ω + τ L ∂Ω

∂D
−
(τ D − μD ) ∂τ
D

(τ D −

=

∂R
∂τ D
∂R
∂Ω

.
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This expression can be written as follows,
¸
D
∂D
∂D
(τ D − μD )
−
∂τ D (1 − τ L ) ∂Ω
∙
¸
μD τ L
∂(T − l∗ ) ∂D
∂(T − l∗ ) ∂D
−
−
(1 − τ L )
∂Ω
∂τ D
∂τ D ∂Ω
∙
¸
D
∂(T − l∗ )
∂(T − l∗ )
−
+ τL
∂τ D
(1 − τ L )
∂Ω
cov(UC , D∗ ) ∂R
−
= 0 . ((A4.3))
(1 − τ L ) E(UC ) ∂Ω
∙

The total eﬀects of a change in environmental taxation on the dirty good
and labor supply are,
D
D
∂D
∂D
∂D
∂D
∂D
=
,
=
−
+
∂τ D
∂τ D v=c (1 − τ L ) ∂M
∂τ D v=c (1 − τ L ) ∂Ω
and

D
∂(T − l∗ )
∂(T − l∗ )
∂l(T − l∗ )
,
=
+
∂τ D
∂τ D v=c (1 − τ L )
∂Ω

respectively. Substituting these values into equation (A4.3) yields,
∙
∙
¸¸
τ L ∂(T − l∗ )
∂D
τ D − μD 1 +
(1 − τ L )
∂Ω
∂τ D v=c
∙
¸
∗
μD ∂D ∂(T − l )
cov(UC , D∗ ) ∂R
. ((A4.4))
+ τL 1 +
=
(1 − τ L ) ∂Ω
∂τ D v=c (1 − τ L )E(UC ) ∂Ω
The first order conditions of the government’s constrained maximization
problem with respect to τ D and τ L yield,39
∗)
cov(UC ,D∗ )
+ τ L ∂(T∂τ−l
E(UC )
D
∗
cov(UC ,w(T −l∗ ))
+ τ L ∂(T∂τ−lL )
E(UC )

∂D
(τ D − μD ) ∂τ
−
D

∂D
(τ D − μD ) ∂τ
−
L

=

∂R
∂τ D
∂R
∂τ L

.

((A4.5))

Substituting the values of the total eﬀects of a changes in environmental and
labour taxation on the dirty good and labor supply from above, equation
39

Notice that had there been no lump sum taxes, this would be the only valid ratio.
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(A4.5) can be written as follows,40
∙
∙
¸
¸¸ ∙
τ L ∂(T − l∗ )
∂D
∂D
∗
τ D − μD 1 −
((T − l ) − Ω)
−D
(1 − τ L ) ∂M
∂τ D v=c
∂τ L v=c
∙
¸
¸∙
∗
μD ∂D
∂(T − l )
∂(T − l∗ )
∗
+ τL 1 −
((T − l ) − Ω)
−D
(1 − τ L ) ∂M
∂τ D v=c
∂τ L v=c
∙
¸
∗
∗
∂(T − l )
∂(T − l )
∂D
∂D
− μD τ L
−
∂τ D v=c ∂τ L v=c ∂τ L v=c ∂τ D v=c
cov(UC , D∗ ) ∂R
cov(UC , w(T − l∗ )) ∂R
−
+
= 0 . ((A4.6))
E(UC ) ∂τ L
E(UC )
∂τ D
The ratio of optimal conditions in equation (A4.4) corresponds to equation (16) in the text, while equation (A4.2) to equation (17) in the text.
Equation (A4.6) is not presented in the main text since lump sum taxes are
available.

40

Ng (1980) optimal condition without the covariance terms can be obtained by setting
Ω = 0. We also include in the tax base of income taxation the lump sum compensation to
the household. In order to make it equivalent to a general consumption tax
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